A Siemens engineer ships a PLC firmware update. An operator installs it.
Nobody can prove the firmware is what Siemens says it is.
Nobody. Not Siemens. Not the operator. Not the regulator.
Your machines have no passport. And no one is checking.
When a device arrives on a factory floor, a power substation, or a water treatment plant, there is no independent way to verify it is what the label says. The identity credential on that PLC was issued by the vendor who made it. The firmware signature was validated by the vendor who wrote it.
You are trusting a vendor to vouch for themselves. This is not carelessness. It is an architectural problem that nobody has solved - because solving it requires neutral infrastructure that no single vendor is motivated to build.
A $20 trillion global OT industry operating without a neutral trust layer.
In IT, this was solved decades ago. SSL. Certificate authorities. DNS. Neutral infrastructure nobody controls but everyone depends on.
OT has nothing equivalent. Until now.
// Why you should care · The key point
The Triton malware attack on a petrochemical plant in 2017 targeted safety instrumentation systems - not by exploiting a zero-day, but by leveraging trusted vendor update channels. Average detection time for OT breaches: 197 days.
Triton (2017) - Industroyer (2016) - PIPEDREAM (2022). Three generations. Same flaw.